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Defendants' Right to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews
with Treating Physicians in Drug or Medical
Device Cases
INTRODUCTION
Litigation involving injuries attributable to drugs' or medi-
cal devices 2 has increased significantly in recent years.3 The
sharply disputed issue of whether defendant manufacturers
have the right to interview privately plaintiffs' treating physi-
cians frequently arises in these cases.4 Such interviews are in-
1. In this Note, the term drug refers to prescription drugs. Federal stat-
utes define prescription drugs as those drugs that pharmacists may dispense
only on a physician's prescription, rather than those sold over the counter. 21
U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1982).
2. A medical device is defined as any instrument, implant, or other arti-
cle recognized by the National Formulary or the United States Pharmacopeia
and designed to cure disease by affecting a patient's physical structure or bod-
ily function without relying principally on some type of chemical action. 21
U.S.C. § 321(h) (1982); see Kessler, Pape & Sundwall, The Federal Regulation
of Medical Devices, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 357 (1987); see, e.g., Phelps v. Sher-
wood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing heart cathe-
ter); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing
heart pacemaker); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 649, 662 P.2d 646,
650 (Ct. App.) (discussing breast implant), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d
645 (1983); Terhune v. A. H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 15, 577 P.2d 975, 978
(1978) (en banc) (discussing Dalkon shield intrauterine contraceptive device).
3. The number of drug malpractice and product liability cases tripled an-
nually between 1976 and 1982. DRUGS IN LITIGATION vii-viii (2d ed. 1982).
4. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 127 (D.D.C. 1983); Pe-
trillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 499 N.E.2d 952, 954-
55 (1986), appeal denied, 113 II. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cerL denied, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987). Various articles have examined ex parte interviews of treating
physicians, but not specifically in the drug or medical device context. See, e.g.,
King & Hall, Waiver of the Physician-Patient Privilege in South Dakota-
May Defense Counsel Conduct Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating Phy-
sicians?, 33 S.D.L. REv. 260 (1988); Lillehaug, Ex Parte Interviews with "Two-
Hatted" Witnesses, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 441 (1986); Tate & Toman, Ex Parte
Physician Conferences: Circumventing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4
ADELPHIA L.J. 31 (1986); Webster, Private Interviews with Plaintiff's Doctor,
FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1988, at 22; Comment, Discovery and the Doctor: Ex-
pansion of Rule 35(b), 34 MONT. L. REV. 257 (1973); Annotation, Discovery:
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formal, ex parte discussions with witnesses about the facts of
the case and the witnesses' opinions.5 Ex parte interviews facil-
itate discovery of relevant information in a quicker and less ex-
pensive manner than more formal modes of discovery.6 Such
interviews also may unearth information unavailable in the
heightened adversarial atmosphere created when opposing
counsel participates in formal discovery.7
Because ex parte interviews perform the valuable role of
preparing witnesses and assisting attorneys in evaluating the
need for more formal discovery, courts generally do not ques-
tion their use. An exception arises when the potential witness
is a treating physician, because ex parte interviews may endan-
ger information protected by the physician-patient privilege.8
The physician, a crucial witness in any personal injury
case,9 becomes an even more vital witness in cases alleging inju-
ries stemming from drug or medical device side effects or fail-
ure. These cases differ from other product liability or personal
injury cases because the prescribing physician actively partici-
pates in the events leading to the lawsuit. The physicians' ex-
perience and knowledge of the drugs or devices at issue and
their information and opinions about the patients are the crux
of such cases. Moreover, defendants often must seek nonprivi-
Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician, 50
A.L.R.4th 714 (1986).
5. Courts long have recognized the right to conduct informal discovery,
including ex parte interviews with potential witnesses during trial preparation.
See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that
Congress did not intend federal procedural rules to eliminate "the use of such
venerable, if informal, discovery techniques as the ex parte interview of a wit-
ness who is willing to speak"). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect
the results of ex parte interviews as attorney work product. Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
6. An ex parte interview of a witness costs less than a deposition and is
easier to schedule. State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
7. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128-29 (D.D.C. 1983).
8. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
9. The treating physician is an important witness in any case placing the
patient's physical condition at issue. The treating physician possesses the
"most relevant information and opinions" about the patient's condition. Orr
v. Sievert, 162 Ga. App. 677, 679-80, 292 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1982). The treating
physician "is often the expert most capable of refuting a plaintiff's unfounded
claims." Webster, supra note 4, at 28. Prescribing physicians in drug or medi-
cal device cases take on greater importance because they know not only about
the patient's physical condition, but also about the drug or medical device, the
manufacturer's warning, and other nonprivileged, but critical facts. See infra
notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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leged information that treating physicians possess to prepare
defenses unique to drug and medical device litigation.
Patients have full access to all information the treating
physicians possess because their attorneys are free to meet with
these physicians without the presence of defense counsel.' 0
Courts commonly bar defendant manufacturers from equal ac-
cess, however, by prohibiting ex parte interviews with the phy-
sicians. 11 Defendants therefore must investigate all facts,
including discovery of nonprivileged information, in the pres-
ence of patients' counsel.
Many courts foster this inequity when attempting to fur-
ther the physician-patient privilege12 or theories of patient pri-
vacy. 13 Consequently, defendants must rely exclusively on
formal methods of discovery, unnecessarily limiting their access
to treating physicians.14 Defendants suffer significant prejudice
in trial preparation and may lose entirely the opportunity to
present favorable fact or opinion evidence.' 5 As a result, courts
sacrifice opportunities for case settlement or pretrial dismissal
on the merits when material facts remain unknown, or become
known only late into trial.1 6 Moreover, plaintiffs' unilateral
knowledge and control of crucial facts present many opportuni-
ties for abuse of the physician-patient privilege.' 7 This problem
inheres in all personal injury and product liability litigation,
but particularly plagues the drug or medical device area be-
cause of the unique nature of these lawsuits.'8
This Note explores defendants' right to conduct ex parte
interviews with treating physicians in drug and medical device
cases. Part I examines the unique nature of drug and medical
device cases and the development of the physician-patient privi-
lege and the patient-litigant waiver. It also discusses the value
of ex parte interviews as discovery tools. Part II details the
10. Patients may interview their own physicians freely, but the implica-
tions of the physician-patient privilege or notions of confidentiality may im-
pede others' access. See, e.g., Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 45, 458
N.E.2d 465, 471 (1983) ("There is no rule, written or unwritten, prohibiting a
party or his attorney from conducting ex parte conferences with that party's
own witnesses.").
11. See infra note 92.
12. Webster, supra note 4, at 28.
13. Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 445.
14. See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
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ways in which ex parte interviews affect the physician-patient
privilege and the patient-litigant waiver and the resulting con-
flict among jurisdictions regarding ex parte interviews of physi-
cians in general. Part III argues that courts generally should
allow ex parte interviews of treating physicians because of the
patient-litigant waiver. It examines the special circumstances
of defendants and treating physicians in drug and medical de-
vice cases and illustrates how courts err by ignoring these addi-
tional factors when analyzing the propriety of ex parte
interviews. The Note argues that these special factors make ex
parte interviews especially appropriate in the drug and medical
device area and proposes specific guidelines for courts to apply
in these cases. The Note concludes that allowing ex parte in-
terviews of physicians will best serve the unique considerations
involved in drug and medical device cases without unduly
harming the physician-patient relationship.
I. DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE CASES: THE USE OF
EX PARTE INTERVIEWS AND THE PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT PROVILEGE
A. UNIQUE NATURE OF DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE CASES
Manufacturers have a general duty to market only reason-
ably safe products and a duty to warn consumers of the risks
involved in product use.19 The learned intermediary rule modi-
fies this general duty to warn in drug and medical device
cases.2 0 Under this rule, courts require the manufacturer to
warn only the prescribing physician,2 1 who acts as a learned in-
19. See, e.g., Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 73 Ill. App. 3d 585,
589, 392 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1979); Eaton, What the Doctor Ordered, BRIEF, Summer
1986, at 24, 26 (stating that "it is well settled in the law of product liability that
the manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate user of known dangers in-
herent in a product").
20. Many jurisdictions have adopted this doctrine. See, e.g., Beyette v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1987); Swayze v. Mc-
Neil Laboratories, Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1987); Brooks v. Medtronic,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1984); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370
F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546,
548 (D. Conn. 1978); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D.
Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90
Wash. 2d 9, 15, 577 P.2d 975, 979 (1978) (en banc).
21. See, e.g., Chambers, 441 F. Supp. at 381; Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67
Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (1981). Courts have carved out two
major exceptions to the learned intermediary defense: mass immunization and
oral contraceptives. Comment, Products Liability: The Continued Viability of
the Learned Intermediary Rule As It Applies to Product Warnings for Pre-
scription Drugs, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 414-19 (1986); see also Note, Oral Con-
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termediary between the manufacturer and the patient.22 If the
manufacturer adequately warns the physician, the manufac-
turer has discharged its duty, even if the physician subse-
quently fails to communicate an adequate warning to the
patient.23 Moreover, if the manufacturer inadequately warns
the physician, but the treating physician independently receives
complete information about the risks of the drug or medical de-
vice, the manufacturer will escape liability because no proxi-
mate cause exists between its inadequate warning and the
injury 24
traceptives: Heading Into an Era of Unpredictability, Unlimited Liability,
and Unavailability?, 19 IND. L. REV. 615, 617 (1986).
22. The court first used the term learned intermediary in Sterling Drug,
370 F.2d at 85.
23. See Comment, supra note 21, at 406-07.
24. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671 (8th Cir. 1985);
Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Conn. 1978); Mulder
v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 334-36, 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970) (cita-
tions omitted); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418,
430-32, 307 A.2d 449, 457-58 (1973). Courts distinguish between two aspects of
causation in drug and medical device cases, medical cause and legal cause.
Medical cause, or cause-in-fact, concerns whether the product at issue or some
alternative entity or process physically caused the patient's injury. The pa-
tient generally meets the burden of proof if the evidence shows that the drug
or medical device contributed substantially to the injury. See, e.g., Flom v.
Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980). The plaintiff must prove medical
cause in any drug or medical device case, regardless of the theories of liability
pleaded. See Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145, 150-51 (4th Cir, 1985) (using
standard of reasonable degree of medical certainty, court held that plaintiff
did not present sufficient evidence of medical causation between defendant's
ventilator and patient's injury). Legal or proximate cause concerns whether
the courts will hold the manufacturer liable for the patient's injury as a result
of the manufacturer's conduct. Physicians' failure to warn or their direct neg-
ligence may break the chain of causation. See, e.g., Chambers v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D. Md. 1975) (holding manufacturer not liable
where prescribing physician testified that he would have prescribed drug de-
spite manufacturer's warnings), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). Although
ex parte interviews facilitate discovery relating to both legal and medical
cause, defendants have a particular need to conduct ex parte interviews for the
preparation of defenses relating to legal cause. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857
F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between liability and causation in
case involving birth defects that drug Bendectin allegedly caused), cert denied,
109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
Many courts also have modified the manufacturers' liability in drug and
medical device cases, refusing to hold manufacturers strictly liable. Important
policy considerations unique to these products underpin this exception. See,
e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1062, 751 P.2d 470, 478, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 420 (1988) (modifying manufacturers' liability because drugs and
medical devices are necessary and valuable products due to their unique pur-
poses: to alleviate pain and suffering and to sustain life). Courts, recognizing
that drugs and medical devices are valuable products, encourage their develop-
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Because the manufacturer has a duty to warn only the pre-
scribing physician,2 5 these physicians act as "two-hatted wit-
nesses"2 6  possessing both privileged and nonprivileged
information in drug or medical device cases. The physician has
privileged information about the patient similar to the informa-
tion physicians possess in traditional personal injury cases. The
prescribing physician also has a wealth of nonprivileged infor-
mation, including information the manfacturer communicates
through package material, advertising, or direct contact by sales
representatives.2 7 The physicians' opinion of the adequacy of
this information is relevant to the manufacturers' duty to
warn.28 The physicians' own training and clinical experience,
previous experience with the product, and knowledge of the
product through independent sources such as peer discussion or
medical literature also represent information both important
and nonprivileged.29
ment and marketing by modifying the standard of liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). By encouraging manufacturers
to develop and market drugs and medical devices, courts promote public pol-
icy; the imposition of strict liability may drive existing products off the market
and may stifle the research and development of new products. Schwartz, Un-
avoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Com-
ment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985). Drug and medical device
manufacturers receive protection even though courts characterize their prod-
ucts as "unavoidably unsafe;" that is, the products may cause injury even if a
company carefully and properly manufactures them. See Lindsay v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that some products
are unsafe no matter what precautions companies take during manufacturing
process); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 61, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1979)
(discussing concept of "unavoidably unsafe" products), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 768,
417 N.E.2d 1002, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980). Courts do not impose strict liability
in these cases, reflecting a policy judgment that the availability of drugs and
medical devices is so vital to society that manufacturers should not be held
strictly liable for the unavoidable injuries the products cause. See, e.g., Brown,
44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478-79, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420 (holding that be-
cause of unique purpose of drug and medical devices, "broader public interest
in the availability of drugs at an affordable price must be considered in decid-
ing the appropriate standard of liability for injuries resulting from their use").
25. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. The concept of the
learned intermediary reflects the treating physicians' unique role in drug and
medical device cases. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264,
1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
26. Commentators have used this term to describe witnesses who may
give both fact and expert testimony. Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 441. This
Note borrows the term to describe prescribing physicians in drug and medical
device cases because they possess both privileged and nonprivileged
information.
27. Note, infra note 31, at 471-74.
28. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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The prescribing physicians' interest in drug or medical de-
vice cases differs from their interest in other personal injury
cases, and may be in direct conflict with the patients' interests.
In a traditional personal injury case, the physician becomes in-
volved in treating the injury after it has occurred, thus facing
no personal liability for the injury.30 In drug and medical de-
vice cases, however, the physician acts as a consumer 3 of the
drug or medical device and has a relationship with the manu-
facturer defendant independent of the physician's relationship
with the patient.32 Consequently, the physician, along with the
manufacturer, may bear legal responsibility for injuries to a pa-
tient resulting from a breach of the duty to warn.33 A court
also may hold the physician directly liable for injuries to the
patient resulting from the negligent prescription of a drug or
medical device.34 Moreover, if the plaintiff sues only the manu-
facturer, the physician faces the risk of a future lawsuit by the
patient, a threat absent in other types of personal injury
cases.
35
30. See infra note 35 (discussing defendant physician's unique role in
medical malpractice actions).
31. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 989, 95 Cal. Rptr.
381, 401 (1971) (stating that "the prescribing doctor... in reality stands in the
shoes of the 'ordinary consumer' "); Note, Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories:
The Physician as Consumer, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 460, 462 (1985). Because of the
physician's role as a drug consumer, the Oksenholt court recognized a physi-
cian's independent cause of action for inadequate drug manufacturer warnings.
Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 294 Or. 213, 220, 656 P.2d 293, 297 (1982).
32. Both a customer and an information relationship exist between the
manufacturer and the prescribing physician. The manufacturer must update
warnings and report adverse product reactions to the physician, a process
wholly independent of the patient's relationship. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that drug manufac-
turer has duty "to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the
manufacturer's product and to notify the medical profession of any additional
side effects discovered from its use"); Note, supra note 31, at 461.
33. See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 340, 181 N.W.2d
882, 887 (1970).
34. Id- at 339, 181 N.W.2d at 886.
35. Medical malpractice actions present physicians with no threat of fu-
ture lawsuits because the patient already has sued the treating or prescribing
physician. The physician and patient therefore already have opposing inter-
ests. See Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 359-60, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878
(1970) (discussing unique role of defendant physician in medical malpractice
action as adverse party, eyewitness, and expert witness). The physician and
patient interests in drug and medical device litigation are not as clearly de-
fined. In most drug and medical device cases, the patient has not yet sued the
prescribing physician, but only the manufacturer. The court in Doe v. Eli Lilly
recognized that patients' counsel could use control of the medical privilege to
threaten treating physicians with liability for unauthorized disclosure of privi-
1989] 1457
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND
PATIENTS' WAIVER OF SUCH PRIVILEGE
Because treating physicians frequently are asked to testify
or otherwise to participate in drug and medical device cases, the
physician-patient privilege usually is implicated in these cases.
This privilege protects the confidentiality36 of patient informa-
tion that an attending physician37 acquires while acting in a
professional capacity. 38 The privilege covers any information
necessary 3 9 for the physician's examination, diagnosis, or treat-
ment of the patient.40 Most states41 have enacted legislation
leged information, but did not examine the possibility that the patient could
use the threat of a future lawsuit concerning the drug or medical device to
prevent the treating physician from fully disclosing all relevant information in
the current litigation against the drug manufacturer. 99 F.R.D. 126, 128-29
(D.D.C. 1983).
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380(a) (J.T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. W.A. Reiser ed. 1988). If a patient com-
municates in the presence of a third party who is unnecessary for medical
treatment, the communications are not confidential, and therefore not privi-
leged. See, e.g., State v. LaRoche, 122 N.H. 231, 233, 442 A.2d 602, 603 (1982).
37. The privilege also extends to physicians' professional communications
to patients. See, e.g., Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953).
38. See e.g., Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 353, 178 N.W.
749, 750-51 (1920) (construing Wisconsin statutory privilege to bar physician
from revealing even information beneficial to survivor's lawsuit).
39. Courts have broadly construed necessary when determining the ex-
tent of the physician-patient privilege. See, e.g., Pride v. Inter-State Business
Men's Accident Ass'n, 207 Iowa 167, 174, 216 N.W. 62, 65 (1927) (stating that
court "will draw no fine lines as to whether a communication is necessary or
unnecessary").
40. Courts will consider examinations conducted for patient treatment
privileged, but examinations done at the request of others for fact-finding
rather than patient treatment are not privileged. See, e.g., State v. Santeyan,
136 Ariz. 108, 110, 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983).
41. As of 1985, 40 states and the District of Columbia had passed physi-
cian-patient privilege statutes. Developments in the Law-Privileged Commu-
nications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1532 (1985) [hereinafter Developments]; see,
e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (Supp. 1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802
(Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(d) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 4504 (McKinney Supp. 1989). The statutes generally have five requirements
for the physician-patient privilege. Kmentt, Private Medical Records: Are
They Public Property?: A Survey of Privacy, Confidentiality and Privilege,
1987 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 274, 277. The person barred from testifying must fit
the statutory definition of covered medical personnel. The protected informa-
tion must flow from a defined medical relationship. The information must
come from a communication or an observation. The patient's treatment must
require the information. Finally, the information must be confidential. Id.
1458 [V7ol. 73:1451
EX PARTE INTER VIEWS
that provides a privilege42 protecting this information.43 A mi-
nority of states have adopted the privilege in limited circum-
stances by judicial construction,44 while others still do not
recognize any physician-patient privilege.45
42. The confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship historically
has stood as a cornerstone of the physicians' code of ethics. The Hippocratic
Oath, dating from the fifth century B.C., states that: "Whatever, in connection
with my professional practice or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the
life of men, which ought not to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as reckon-
ing that all such should be kept secret." Reprinted in B. MALOY, THE SIMPLI-
FIED MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAwYERS 372 (3d ed. 1960); see also Ward, Pre-
Trial Waiver of the Physician/Patient Privilege, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 59, 62-65
(1986) (stating that physician's duty of confidentiality originates not only from
statutory privilege, but also from civil rules, implied contract between physi-
cian and patient, and patient's right to privacy). The common law, however,
did not recognize a physician-patient testimonial privilege. State v. Staat, 291
Minn. 394, 396-97, 192 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1971). The courts at common law
therefore gave no legal protection to communications between physicians and
patients. See, e.g., State v. Devanney, 12 Conn. App. 288, 292, 530 A.2d 650, 652-
53 (1987) (reasoning that communications between physician and patient have
no legal protection because Connecticut has no statutory medical privilege and
common law recognizes none, thus courts freely may admit physician's testi-
mony about patient). The physician-patient privilege has been a source of
great controversy. Compare Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J.
61, 85 (1973) (observing that evidence experts agree that privileges serve no
important social purpose) with Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Con-
fusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956)
(stating that handicapping legal process is "not too great a price to pay" for
certain privileges); see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
43. State v. Staat, 291 Minn. 394, 396-97, 192 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1971) (noting
that New York was first state to enact such legislation in 1828). "Nineteenth-
century legislatures created the privilege primarily as a public health measure
to encourage people to seek medical assistance." Developments, supra note 41,
at 1532.
44. Alabama judicially recognized a limited physician-patient privilege ab-
sent a statutory privilege in Ho-ne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708-09, 287 So. 2d
824, 829-30 (1973), as did New Jersey in Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336,
181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). New Jersey subsequently adopted the privilege by
statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976).
45. Through 1985, Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia
had not enacted statutes recognizing a physician-patient privilege. Develop-
ments, supra note 41, at 1532 n.9. Federal law also does not provide a physi-
can-patient privilege. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp.
607, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 460 F. Supp. 150, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1978). In diversity actions, federal
courts consider the existence of the physician-patient privilege substantive for
Erie purposes. State law thus controls whether federal courts recognize the
privilege in such cases. See, e.g., Lind v. Canada Dry Corp., 283 F. Supp. 861,
863-65 (D. Minn. 1968). Courts also have held that the physician-patient privi-
lege has "no constitutional underpinnings." State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59
(Mo. 1982) (en banc), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
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A variety of policy considerations support the physician-pa-
tient privilege. The law recognizes a privilege because the ben-
efits derived from protecting the physician-patient relationship
outweigh the costs of confidentiality, including the inhibition of
fact-finding during litigation.46 Other justifications focus on the
interests of the individual patient.47 The physician-patient priv-
ilege acknowledges patients' privacy interests in their own
medical care.48 The privilege also shields patients from the po-
tential embarrassment of unauthorized disclosure of personal
information. 49 Confidentiality encourages patients to speak
frankly with their physicians, thus increasing the likelihood of
successful medical treatment.5 0 The physicians' professional
46. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2380a, at 830-31 (arguing fallacy of
this perception). Courts examine four factors when recognizing a privilege:
the party must have communicated in confidence; the confidentiality must be
essential to the protected relationship; the community must make a value
judgment that the relationship is one that courts should foster; and the injury
to the relationship from disclosure must be greater than the benefit gained by
the correct disposal of the litigation. Id. at 829-32.
47. As support for traditional justifications of the medical privilege
eroded, see infra note 55, courts and commentators began to defend the privi-
lege as necessary to guard patients' rights to privacy concerning medical infor-
mation. Developments, supra note 41, at 1480-83, 1544.
48. See, e.g., Orr v. Sievert, 162 Ga. App. 677, 679, 292 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1982)
(finding that without statutory privilege patient still has qualified right to pri-
vacy implicit in Hippocratic Oath); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 227,
721 P.2d 918, 928 (1986) (en banc) (finding that privacy rights extend to rela-
tionship with physician), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987); Note, Medical
Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 MJNN. L. REV. 943, 952-61 (1959) (examin-
ing situations when physician should be permitted to reveal patient's confi-
dences). Courts regularly use a balancing test when resolving conflicts
between the patient's right to privacy and the government's attempt to pene-
trate protected areas. Kmentt, supra note 41, at 274. The patient's right to
privacy in the medical arena is unclear and undefined. Lora v. Board of Educ.,
74 F.R.D. 565, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
49. State v. Staat, 291 Minn. 394, 397, 192 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1971); see also
Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Con-
gressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 50-52 (suggesting that courts should expand pro-
tection of physician-patient relationship in recognition of its extremely private
nature).
50. Branch v. Wilkinson, 198 Neb. 649, 658, 256 N.W.2d 307, 313 (1977).
But see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2380a, at 829-30 (reasoning that absence
of privilege will not deter patients from open communications with physicians
because patients' desire for proper medical care will outweigh their confiden-
tiality concerns); Developments, supra note 41, at 1543 & n.92 (noting that
commentators have attacked idea that privilege encourages open disclosure be-
cause there is "no authoritative empirical evidence to prove or disprove the
proposition that the physician-patient privilege . . . actually encourages
communication").
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ethical duty also justifies the privilege.51 Some courts place
physicians in a fiduciary relationship to patients,52 obligating
physicians to remain silent about professional communications
absent some legal justification for disclosure.53 Other courts
reason that the privilege protects physicians from unnecessary
involvement in litigation.1
The physician-patient privilege, however, is not absolute.55
51. See supra note 42; see also Note, To Tell or Not to Tel: Physician's
Liability for Disclosure of Confidential Information about a Patient, 13 CUMB.
L. REV. 617, 620-37 (1983) (discussing various statutory, professional, and ethi-
cal bases for physicians' fiduciary duty to patients). But see Coralluzzo v. Fass,
450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984) (stating that even if physicians violate ethical
standards, court will have no jurisdiction to review because state has not codi-
fied these standards; medical profession must determine if such violations
exist).
52. "The fiducial nature of the physician-patient relationship flows not
from the physician's ethical duties, but rather as a result of the physician's
unique role in society." Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d
581, 593, 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d
361, cer denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987). "A fiduciary relationship exists where
there is a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good ccinscience
is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one
reposing the confidence." Neagle v. McMullen, 334 Ill. 168, 175, 165 N.E. 605,
608 (1929).
53. See, e.g., Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (noting
that physician owes patient fiduciary duty of confidentiality).
54. See, e.g., Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 410, 240 N.W.2d 333,
336-37 (1976) (en banc).
55. Danielson v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 41, 43, 754 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Ct.
App. 1987) (discussing limited nature of physician-patient privilege). Most ju-
risdictions recognize some form of physician-patient privilege. See supra note
41 and accompanying text. The privilege, however, has received much criti-
cism. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (ob-
serving that physician-patient privilege has "been the object of virtually
unanimous scholarly criticism"); C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 32 (1958) (noting that critics of medical
privilege "have become predominant"). Some critics assert there is no valid
basis for the privilege. See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (suggesting that in majority of
cases, patient uses physician-patient privilege "for the single purpose of win-
ning a lawsuit by excluding relevant and material evidence"); 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 36, § 2380a, at 832 (noting that "[t]here is little to be said in favor of
the privilege, and a great deal to be said against it"); Chafee, Privileged Com-
munications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth
on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609-14 (1943) (criticizing policies used
to justify physician-patient privilege). Evidence experts charge that the privi-
lege incorrectly balances conflicting policies because it does substantial dam-
age to the legal process without much benefit to either the physician or the
patient. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2380a, at 829-30 (suggesting physician-
patient privilege is unjustified and unnecessary because resulting injury to
fact-finding ability of legal process far outweighs any injury done to the physi-
cian-patient relationship resulting from compelled disclosure of medical infor-
mation). However, "no solid empirical data exists to support the estimates of
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State legislatures have adopted statutes reflecting interests that
override the privilege.5 6 Moreover, patients may expressly
waive the privilege,57 and in certain circumstances courts will
either critics or proponents as to either the costs or the benefits of privileges."
Developments, supra note 41, at 1474; see also Chafee, supra, at 609-10 (stating
that no evidence supports alleged benefits of physician-patient privilege).
"Weaknesses in the theoretical foundations of privilege law have prompted
charges not only that privileges are irrational and arbitrary, but also that they
have been molded principally by improper influences." Developments, supra
note 41, at 1471. Privilege law does not attempt "to encourage communications
or to protect privacy" but is merely "special treatment won by the power of
those privileged." Id. at 1493 (citing E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES,
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 526 (1983)); see also Krattenmaker, supra note
42, at 85 (observing that majority of evidence experts attribute testimonial
privileges to "competing professional jealousies, resulting in no other societal
benefit and great cost to accuracy of fact finding during litigation"). Indeed,
some privilege cases focus on the protection of the physician rather than the
patient. See, e.g., Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 410, 240 N.W.2d 333,
336 (1976) (en banc) (court supervision of depositions with physicians protects
"the medical profession against unnecessary harassment or involvement in the
discovery procedure") (quoting 2 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA
PRACTICE: RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 82 (1970)). Courts should
construe the privilege strictly because it prevents the admission of relevant ev-
idence. State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47, 58, 424 A.2d 1182, 1188 (App. Div.
1980), cert. denied, 87 N.J. 313, 434 A.2d 67 (1981). The privilege also under-
mines the administration of justice because it suppresses "what is ordinarily
the best source of proof, namely, the physician who examined and treated the
patient, upon what is usually a crucial issue, namely, the physical or mental
condition of the patient." MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 105, at 226 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter EVIDENCE].
56. Exceptions to the privilege reflect superseding interests of society.
Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). Numerous statu-
tory provisions carve exceptions to the privilege, defining situations in which
the importance of full disclosure during litigation outweighs the policies be-
hind the privilege. Examples include actions to contest a will, see, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.3 (West 1976), or to commit a patient to a mental insti-
tution, see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207(a)(3) (Supp. 1988). Other statutes
impose an affirmative duty on physicians, overriding the physician-patient
privilege, to report information about certain types of medical treatment, in-
cluding gunshot or knife wounds, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKin-
ney 1980), sexually transmitted disease, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
527 (West 1984), or child abuse, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982
& Supp. 1989). In these situations, societal interests of public health and
safety outweigh the benefits of the physician-patient privilege. Note, supra
note 51, at 627 (noting that courts may find physician's fiduciary duty of confi-
dentiality subservient to higher duty to disclose information due to overriding
public interest, for example, when patient has highly contagious disease).
57. The term waiver covers those situations in which the medical privi-
lege is set aside "because [the patient] affirmatively places her physical or
emotional condition at issue." Developments, supra note 41, at 1537 n.39. Be-
cause the privilege primarily protects patients, most jurisdictions reason that
patients, rather than physicians, control the privilege. See, e.g., Wesley Medi-
cal Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 19-20, 669 P.2d 209, 214 (1983) (finding that
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imply a waiver.58 A court may imply a waiver when the bal-
ance between the costs and the benefits of the medical privilege
tips in favor of disclosure during litigation.5 9 Such considera-
tions include facilitating settlement,60 expediting discovery,6 1
and increasing the probability of just litigation results.62 Courts
patient, not physician, "may assert the privilege or prevent others from re-
vealing the privileged information"); Maas v. Laursen, 219 Minn. 461, 463, 18
N.W.2d 233, 234 (1945) (same); State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694
S.W.2d 882, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (same). Patients therefore may waive the
privilege by express consent. Most jurisdictions require that an express waiver
be voluntary and clearly intentional. See, e.g., Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App.
2d 166, 178, 303 P.2d 839, 847 (1956). A patient's express waiver of the privilege
thus is similar to the traditional concept of waiver, used in contract or consti-
tutional law, which courts define as the "intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). Patients often give an express waiver when applying for insurance or
employment and in other similar situations. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan. 146, 154-55, 96 P. 62, 65-66 (1908) (holding party may
waive physician-patient privilege by contract when applying for life insurance
policy); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 10 Ohio App. 2d 137, 140, 226
N.E.2d 760, 762 (1967) (holding application for uninsured motorist coverage
may operate as express waiver of physician-patient privilege). But see Gil-
christ v. Mystic Workers of World, 196 Mich. 247, 251-52, 163 N.W. 10, 11 (1917)
(finding patient's express agreement to waive privilege against public policy of
Michigan statute).
58. While express waiver allocates control of the privilege between pa-
tient and physician, the doctrine of implied waiver allocates control of the
privilege between the patient and the judicial system. See Developments,
supra note 41, at 1630 & n.2. Without expressly waiving the medical privilege,
a patient may unknowingly and unintentionally act in a manner that subse-
quently will result in the court implying a waiver. A court may find an im-
plied waiver even though a patient is unaware that a medical privilege exists.
See i&. at 1629 n.1. Courts also may imply a waiver even though a patient has
no intention of waiving the privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2327, at
636. Courts should recognize a waiver when fairness dictates setting aside the
privilege as a result of the patient's own actions, even if the patient did not
specifically act or intend to waive the privilege. Id
59. "Implied waiver operates as the circuit-breaker of privilege law ...
protect[ing] the legal system from abuses . Developments, supra note 41,
at 1629 (footnote omitted).
60. Implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege protects against the
danger of discouraging settlement due to insufficient information. See Devel-
opments, supra note 41, at 1635-36.
61. See, e.g., State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968)
(en banc).
62. See, e.g., Chester v. Zima, 41 Misc. 2d 676, 677-78, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146
(Erie County Sup. Ct. 1964) (reasoning that purpose of pretrial discovery is to
make information available to opposing party in interest of truth and justice;
thus plaintiffs bringing lawsuits to recover for personal injuries remove them-
selves from protection of physician-patient privilege); Dyson v. Hempe, 140
Wis. 2d 792, 804, 413 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Ct. App. 1987) (defining abuse of attor-
ney-client privilege as waiver); Developments, supra note 41, at 1633-35 (1985)
(discussing wisdom of deeming partial disclosure as waiver of privilege for all
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commonly set aside the patient's privilege when the privilege
does injustice to a defendant during litigation 3 or when a pa-
tient's own actions 64 already have impaired the confidentiality
of the privileged information.6 5
Most jurisdictions hold that filing a lawsuit placing the pa-
tient's physical condition directly at issue operates as an im-
plied waiver of the medical privilege regarding that condition.66
withheld information concerning same subject matter, "because disclosure in-
troduces evidence without providing the opposing party an opportunity to es-
tablish its context").
63. Patients' partial or strategic disclosure of privileged information may
cause injustice to opposing parties. Developments, supra note 41, at 1631-33.
Partial disclosure results when the privilege holder seeks to reveal only
favorable information. "[A] party cannot, by selective invocation of the privi-
lege, disclose documents or give testimony favorable to that party while failing
to disclose cognate material unfavorable to that party." Teachers Ins. & Annu-
ity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(citations omitted); C. DEWrTT, supra note 55, at 37 (suggesting that "[a] pa-
tient may keep the door of the sick-room closed, but he should not be permit-
ted to open it so as to give an imperfect or false view of what took place there,
and promptly shut the door the moment the true facts are about to be re-
vealed"); see also Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 91, 267 S.W. 400, 403 (1924)
(holding patient claiming nervous condition as result of injury may not block
testimony of physician who had treated same condition prior to alleged in-
jury). Strategic disclosure occurs when patients release relevant medical evi-
dence at a time most favorable to their lawsuit. See Developments, supra note
41, at 1632-33. By waiting until trial to disclose relevant medical information,
patients gain great tactical advantage because defendants do not have time
properly to prepare defense theories. Id. at 1647; see Chester v. Zima, 41 Misc.
2d 676, 677-78, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Erie County Sup. Ct. 1964). But see Boyd
v. Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9, 11 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (finding patient-litigant waiver
is not effective until treating physician actually testifies at trial).
64. Courts may imply a waiver after any voluntary disclosure of privileged
information by a patient. For example, courts have held that plaintiffs' pre-
trial testimony waives the physician-patient privilege. Covington v. Sawyer, 9
Ohio App. 3d 40, 45-46, 458 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1983) (citations omitted).
65. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2389, at 855 (suggesting that patient
implies that privilege is no longer important by filing lawsuit publicly expos-
ing physical condition at issue); see also Developments, supra note 41, at 1630-
31 (discussing situations in which courts commonly set privileges aside).
66. See, e.g., Dennie v. University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, 638 F.
Supp. 1005, 1006 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding plaintiffs waived all privileges
against disclosure of medical records by filing lawsuit); Burlage v. Hauden-
shield, 42 F.R.D. 397, 398 (N.D. Iowa 1967) (holding physician-patient privilege
waived when patient raised damage issue); Trans-World Inv. v. Drobny, 554
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976) (holding that filing personal injury action waives
physician-patient privilege); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 407, 240
N.W.2d 333, 335 (1976) (en banc) (stating physician-patient privilege is waived
when patient places health at issue); State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d
597, 601-02 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (holding patient waives physician-patient priv-
ilege by bringing physical condition into pleading); Jaap v. District Court, 623
P.2d 1389, 1391 (Mont. 1981) (holding that commencing personal injury action
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Courts recognize this patient-litigant exception 67 because filing
such a suit impairs the confidentiality of relevant medical infor-
mation and the subsequent enforcement of the privilege seems
inequitable. 6 The patient-litigant waiver promotes discovery of
facts relevant to the plaintiff's alleged injury, thereby minimiz-
ing the potential for patient abuse of the medical privilege re-
sulting from strategic or partial disclosure. 69 The patient-
litigant waiver allows the defendant more complete access to
relevant medical information,70 and better enables courts to
make decisions based on the facts of each case.71
waived privilege as to mental or physical condition in controversy); Mattison v.
Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 161, 353 A.2d 327, 330 (1976) (bringing action for damages
for injuries suffered waives physician-patient privilege). But see, State ex rel.
Floyd v. Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St. 2d 27, 28, 377 N.E.2d 794, 795
(1978) (per curiam) (determining that party does not waive physician-patient
privilege by filing suit for personal injuries resulting from accident). Although
most jurisdictions imply a waiver when a patient files a lawsuit placing a phys-
ical or mental condition at issue, this consensus is misleading. Courts differ
significantly on the scope of this implied waiver. See infra notes 88-93 and ac-
companying text. Patients also may waive the physician-patient privilege by
introducing their physical condition as an element of an affirmative defense or
as the basis of a counterclaim. See, e.g., Collins v. Bair, 252 N.E.2d 448, 455
(Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that if patients place physical condition at issue
by complaint, counterclaim, or affirmative defense, they automatically waive
privilege for all matters causally or historically related to condition), rev'd on
other grounds, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971). State statutes also may pro-
vide that the filing of a personal injury lawsuit acts as a waiver. See, e.g., DEL.
R. EVID. 503(d)(3) (1987); MINN. R. Civ. P. 35.03 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-22.4 (West 1976). The patient-litigant exception generally does not
apply when a third party places the patient's physical condition at issue. See,
e.g., Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 10-11 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (stating
privilege was not waived because privilege holder did not place his physical or
mental condition at issue); Mohammad v. Mohammad, 358 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding wife did not waive patient-psychiatrist privilege
by denying husband's allegations concerning her mental condition), appeal on
other grounds after remand, 371 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
67. Courts and commentators typically characterize this waiver as "the
patient-litigant exception," even though many times it is not a statutory excep-
tion, but rather a waiver that courts will imply. See Developments, supra note
41, at 1537 (discussing waiver terminology confusion).
68. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 63; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2389; EVIDENCE,
supra note 55, § 105; C. DEWITT, supra note 55, at 36-37.
70. See, e.g., Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456-57, 480 A.2d 223,
229-30 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that search for truth and justice mandates that
defendants have equal access to potential witnesses, even treating physicians).
71. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501-07 (1947) (asserting that
discovery should provide "fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial"); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 574, 575 (D. Minn.
1981) (stating that purpose of discovery is to expose all evidence, thus facilitat-
ing full and fair trials on merits).
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Many courts find that the patient-litigant waiver takes ef-
fect immediately after the plaintiff files a lawsuit. 72 This tim-
ing facilitates disclosure of relevant medical information during
discovery.73 Early disclosure of information supports the un-
derlying purpose of discovery: preventing surprise at trial and
promoting just results by providing all parties with access to
material facts.74 If courts do not imply a waiver at the onset of
litigation, the privilege may become a tactical weapon that the
plaintiff wields to control the timing and content of the medical
information disclosed.75 Permitting the patient to retain this
control abuses the privilege, because it allows the patient to se-
lect which information is discoverable and to reveal only
favorable information, thus "practically ensur[ing] the unrelia-
bility of the disclosed material. '76 Many courts therefore have
recognized that defendants have the right to investigate all rel-
evant medical information immediately after the plaintiff has
72. See, e.g., Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct.
1985); see also Collins v. Bair, 252 N.E.2d 448, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (finding
that if patient places physical condition at issue by complaint, counterclaim, or
affirmative defense, privilege automatically is waived for all matters causally
or historically related to condition), rev'd on other grounds, 256 Ind. 230, 268
N.E.2d 95 (1971). But see Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1208, 159 S.W.2d
291, 295 (1942) (per curiam) (stating that patient's right to privacy includes
right to have information given to physician during treatment kept confiden-
tial absent patient's express consent); Avery v. Nelson, 455 P.2d 75, 80 (Okla.
1969) (holding that after lawsuit is filed, defendant may not investigate rele-
vant, privileged information absent patient's express consent).
73. Developments, supra note 41, at 1639 (suggesting that when patient
bears burden of proof on issue and must introduce privileged information at
trial to meet that burden, then "waiver is clearly warranted at the discovery
stage"). Information outside the scope of the implied waiver is protected dur-
ing the discovery phase of litigation and during trial. Developments, supra
note 41, at 1637-39; see also Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127 Misc. 2d 124, 126, 485
N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (Erie County Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that patient waives
privilege by commencing personal injury suit, but only with respect to mate-
rial issues). A physician disclosing privileged information without a proper
waiver may face civil liability for breach of patient confidentiality. See infra
note 100 and accompanying text.
74. Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 574, 575 (D. Minn. 1981).
75. If the plaintiff inevitably must reveal privileged information to prevail
at trial, it is not fair to permit the patient to control the timing and circum-
stances of the information's release. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128
(D.D.C. 1983); Note, Evidence: Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege, 51
MINN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1967) (stating that "[i]t is obviously inequitable to al-
low the plaintiff the tactical advantage resulting from late waiver."). Patients
are to use the medical privilege as a shield, not a sword. See, e.g., State ex rel
McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
76. Developments, supra note 41, at 1632,
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exposed privileged information by filing suit.77
C. Ex PARTE INTERVIEWS
Ex parte interviews are vital discovery tools that counsel
generally may use with any witness during discovery.78 These
interviews perform an entirely different role from other, more
formal methods of discovery because attorneys conduct them in
private, without the potential interference and disruption that
opposing counsel's presence may cause.79 Ex parte interviews
protect both witnesses and attorneys by providing an opportu-
nity to prepare properly before formal depositions.8 0 A formal
77. See, e.g., Sklagen v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991,
992 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that "[h]aving waived the medical privilege as to
materials favorable to her position it would be manifestly unfair to allow
plaintiff to invoke the privilege to shield similar materials which are poten-
tially damaging.").
78. Some jurisdictions hold that prohibiting ex parte interviews with wit-
nesses violates those witnesses' first amendment rights. See, e.g., Vega v.
Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1977); Rodriguez v. Percell, 391
F. Supp. 38, 41-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Expert witnesses called in preparation for
trial, however, must be formally deposed under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The advisory committee notes to the federal proce-
dural rules emphasize that this limit on discovery methods includes only those
witnesses acquiring their information for trial preparation. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503 (1969-70). The rule does
not apply to witnesses acquiring knowledge as actors in or viewers of the
transactions at issue. These witnesses should be treated as ordinary witnesses.
1d, at 503. Treating physicians in personal injury cases acquire their informa-
tion as a result of their role in the patient's treatment, independent of any liti-
gation. Thus, access to treating physicians is not limited to formal depositions
by the federal procedural rules. See, e.g., Keith v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co.,
86 F.R.D. 458, 460 (E..D. Pa. 1980); cf Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40,
45, 458 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1983) (construing Ohio procedural rules to find no such
limits); Frantz v. Golebiewski, 407 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(finding defendant's access to treating dentist is not limited to formal deposi-
tion by "expert witness-discovery rule" under Florida procedural rules, which
are identical to federal rules).
79. "There is an important difference between the nature of informal in-
terviews and more formal procedures such as the taking of a deposition."
Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1977). Although parties
use both methods to uncover facts, formal depositions serve other, entirely dif-
ferent purposes: to "perpetuate testimony, to have it available for use or con-
frontation at the trial, or to have the witness committed to a specific
representation of such facts as he might present." IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526
F.2d 37, 41 n.4 (1975) (per curiam). But see Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn.
405, 412, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (1976) (en banc) (providing defendants with slight
tactical advantage is only additional value of ex parte interviews over formal
depositions); Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 509 N.E.2d 1376, 1384
(Ct. App.) (stating that ex parte interviews provide same information as for-
mal depositions), appeal denied, 117 Ill.2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987).
80. Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 455, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (App.
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deposition may more accurately reflect witnesses' statements
when they have had the opportunity to clarify their testimony
during ex parte interviews before deposition.8 ' Attorneys use
ex parte interviews to investigate the content and extent of a
witness's knowledge to decide if the time and expense of formal
depositions are necessary or desirable.8 2 For example, if a wit-
ness possesses information that undermines the case of the
party calling that witness, ex parte interviews provide the only
forum in which to discover this information without exposing it
prematurely to the opposing party during a formal deposition.
Attorneys' work product, including evaluation of theories and
evidence,8 3 also remains protected because attorneys are able to
investigate and prepare privately possible defense theories with
witnesses, without revealing to opposing counsel any informa-
tion entitled to work product protection.8 4 Ex parte interviews
also reduce litigation costs by facilitating preparation of physi-
cians' affidavits in support of summary judgment motions8 5 and
by supplying information that may lead to earlier evaluation
and settlement of cases.8 6 Because of ex parte interviews' im-
mense value, all jurisdictions recognize the right to conduct
them absent the physician-patient or other privilege.8 7
Div. 1984). Deposing a physician without prior preparation impedes discovery
goals. Id. at 455, 480 A.2d at 229.
81. IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (1975) (per curiam) (discussing
superiority of ex parte interviews over formal depositions for preparation of
witnesses, court emphasized that "a potential witness, upon reflection, will
often change, modify or expand upon his original statement and that a second
or third interview will be productive of greater accuracy").
82. Id. at 41 n.4.
83. Attorneys' work product includes files and mental impressions made
in preparation for trial. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-13 (1947).
Although courts do not deem this information privileged, it has qualified im-
munity and may not be discovered absent a substantial showing of necessity by
the party seeking such discovery. Id. at 511.
84. Information gathered during ex parte interviews may reflect counsel's
mental impressions of the case, and courts will protect it as attorney work
product. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947); IBM Corp. v. Edelstein,
526 F.2d 37, 41 (1975) (per curiam).
85. See, e.g., Schramel v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 86-0198 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4,
1988) (granting summary judgment to defendant drug manufacturer on basis
of physician's affidavit taken during ex parte interview).
86. Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976).
87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. All the cases dealing with
ex parte interviews involve some type of privilege, with the vast majority con-
cerning the physician-patient privilege. Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 443; see,
e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska 1987) (allowing defen-
dant ex parte interview with plaintiff's treating physician in personal injury
case); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 593, 499 N.E.2d
1468 [V7ol. 73:1451
EX PARTE INTERVIEWS
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF
IMPLIED WAIVER ON DEFENDANTS' USE OF
EX PARTE INTERVIEWS
Defendants' desire to conduct ex parte interviews in drug
and medical device cases complicates the question of the proper
scope of the patient-litigant waiver, because such cases also im-
plicate the physician-patient privilege.8 8 Absent some type of
952, 960-62 (1986) (prohibiting defense counsel's ex parte interview with plain-
tiff's treating physician in product liability action), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d
584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987). Only one case, IBM
Corp. v. Edelstein, does not involve the physician-patient privilege, but instead
concerns attorney work-product. 526 F.2d 37, 41 (1975) (per curiam).
88. When determining the scope of the patient-litigant waiver, all courts
use a balancing test to weigh the conflicting policies involved. The court in
Stempler v. Speidell framed the ex parte issue as one whose resolution re-
quires courts to "weigh the interests protected by the patient-physician privi-
lege and the physician's professional obligation of confidentiality against the
interests advanced by permitting defense counsel to conduct ex parte inter-
views with .. .physicians regarding those conditions pertinent to the claims
asserted in the litigation." 100 N.J. 368, 373-74, 495 A.2d 857, 859 (1985). Ex
parte interviews also raise the issue of whether the scope of the patient-liti-
gant waiver is substantive or procedural under the Erie doctrine. The exist-
ence of the physician-patient privilege is considered substantive, and state law
therefore defines it. Lind v. Canada Dry Corp., 283 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D. Minn.
1968). It is unclear, however, whether state privilege laws or the appropriate
procedural rules, either state or federal, control the scope of an implied waiver
of the privilege. Compare, e.g., Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D.
Alaska 1973) (holding state law determines patient-litigant waiver; once privi-
lege is waived, federal procedural rules dictate extent of waiver) with, e.g., Si-
mon v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 4-80-160 (D. Minn. May 1, 1986) (stating that
type of medical discovery federal courts permit reflects policies determined by
state privilege law). Other jurisdictions reason that the ex parte issue raises
both procedural and substantive questions regarding the extent of the physi-
cian-patient privilege and its waiver. See, e.g., Wenninger v. Muesing, 307
Minn. 405, 407-12, 240 N.W.2d 333, 335-37 (1976) (en banc) (addressing both
whether filing personal injury suit waives privilege and which discovery proce-
dures are available to defendant once privilege is waived). Once a court im-
plies a waiver of the medical privilege after a patient files a lawsuit, the court
must make another inquiry. The court must ascertain the appropriate proce-
dural rules that it must use to define the methods of informal discovery per-
missible. Id, at 410, 240 N.W.2d at 335-37. This inquiry presents problems
because "[p]hysician-patient privilege statutes rarely state what methods of
disclosure are to be used." Hayes, Do Ex Parte Interviews Threaten Patient
Privacy? Yes, BRIEF, Fall 1987, at 6, 12; see, e.g., Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d
858, 859 (Fla. 1984) (finding that no law, rule of procedure, or rule of profes-
sional responsibility proscribes ex parte interviews in Florida); Stempler v.
Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 373, 495 A.2d 857, 859 (1985) (stating that in New Jersey
"no statute or rule expressly precludes ex parte interviews concerning" medi-
cal information about condition at issue). Because statutes typically are silent
on the ex parte issue, courts must add gloss to procedural rules to make this
determination. But see MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 5 (1988) (explicitly permit-
ting informal discussions between defendants and treating physicians in medi-
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privilege, counsel may conduct ex parte interviews with any
witness concerning information relevant to pending litigation.8 9
If the court holds that the physician-patient privilege remains
intact after a patient files suit, however, defense counsel may
not interview the physician.90 After courts imply a waiver of
the privilege, some courts permit defense counsel to conduct ex
parte interviews.9 ' Other courts, however, still will not permit
defendants to conduct ex parte interviews after implying a pa-
tient-litigant waiver.92 Many jurisdictions therefore differ on
the issue of whether the patient-litigant waiver permits defend-
ants to conduct ex parte interviews with treating physicians.9 3
cal malpractice actions; patient's attorney, however, "must have the
opportunity to be present at any informal discussion"). Courts add gloss to
procedural rules by weighing the conflicting policies involved in much the
same manner as that in which they determine whether to imply a waiver of
the physician-patient privilege. See, e.g., Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148,
150-54, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583-86 (Queens County Sup. Ct.) (weighing conflicting
policies results in court prohibiting ex parte interviews), aff'd mem., 73
A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1979). But see Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d
1257, 1258 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (asserting that "[t]his Court will not condone
the use of the formal discovery rules as a shield against defense counsel's in-
formal access to a witness when these rules were intended to simplify trials by
expediting the flow of litigation.., and to encourage the production of evi-
dence"); Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 443 (noting that lack of specific provisions
for ex parte interviews in procedural rules suggests "that their drafters did not
intend to prohibit a traditional, inexpensive method of discovery").
89. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (hold-
ing that no party "has anything resembling a proprietary right to any wit-
ness's evidence. Absent a privilege no party is entitled to restrict an
opponent's access to a witness, however partial or important to him, by insist-
ing upon some notion of allegiance.").
90. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 347, 429 N.W.2d
891, 900 (1988) (emphasizing that if court cannot compel patient to waive privi-
lege, court cannot compel treating physician to engage in ex parte interview).
91. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing counsel to conduct private ex parte interview);
see also Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976) (find-
ing no legal impediments to "informal methods of discovery such as private
conferences with the attending physicians").
92. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (stating waiver of testimonial privilege does not authorize
"private conference between doctor and defense lawyer"); Wenninger v. Mues-
ing, 307 Minn. 405, 410, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976) (en banc) (declaring private
interview invalid); Jaap v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Mont. 1981)
(concluding that "a private interview of an adversary witness [physician]" is
not an acceptable method of discovery under the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure).
93. Compare, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1373-74 & n.4
(Alaska 1987) (recognizing courts may sanction plaintiff's counsel if counsel
blocks ex parte interviews, thereby forcing defendant to get court order to in-
terview treating physician) with, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148
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A. Ex PARTE INTERVIEWS PROHIBITED ALTHOUGH COURT
IMPLIED PATIENT-LITIGANT WAIVER
Some courts hold that although a patient impliedly has
waived the physician-patient privilege by filing a lawsuit, the
defendant still has no right to conduct ex parte interviews with
treating physicians.94 These courts limit defendants' access to
such witnesses to formal methods of discovery.9 5 Without pa-
tients' express consent to ex parte interviews, defendants may
not discuss any information, even nonprivileged matters, with
physicians unless formally deposing them.9 6
Courts prohibiting ex parte interviews place greater em-
phasis on the policies suppoiting the physician-patient privilege
than on those policies favoring defendants' rights. Courts com-
Ill. App. 3d 581, 610, 499 N.E.2d 952, 971 (1986) (holding defense counsel in con-
tempt for conducting ex parte interview with treating physician), appeal de-
nied, 113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987). The
federal district court in Minnesota also illustrates this controversy by splitting
on the issue. In Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 4-80-160 (D. Minn. May 1,
1986), Judge Renner adopted, without opinion, a special master's order deny-
ing ex parte interviews in a drug case. The special master followed the Minne-
sota state rule, defined in Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 410, 240
N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976) (en banc), reasoning that Wenninger reflected the sub-
stantive policy of the state. Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 4-80-160, Special
Master Discovery Order at 2 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 1986). In contrast, Judge Ro-
senbaum allowed ex parte interviews in a medical malpractice diversity case,
viewing the issue as one of federal procedural law rather than state substan-
tive law. Thomsen v. Mayo Foundation, No. 4-84-1239 (D. Minn. Aug. 20,
1986). Judge Doty followed Thomsen in Jenson v. Playtex Family Prod., Inc.,
No. 4-87-908 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 1988), a toxic shock syndrome case. Judge
Magnuson also permitted ex parte interviews in O'Brien v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3-
88-282 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1989) (involving prescription drug Feldene).
94. See, e.g., Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959 (stating that
by filing suit, patient waives medical privilege, but this waiver does not extend
to ex parte interviews with treating physicians); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash.
2d 675, 677, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988) (en banc) (holding ex parte interviews
prohibited as matter of public policy). Some Minnesota state courts take the
next step, and deny defendants access to treating physicians through formal
depositions by finding that defendants have not shown "good cause" as re-
quired by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 35.04(6). See, e.g., Yanta v. G.D.
Searle & Co., No. 447569 (Ramsey County. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1988); Boyd v. G.D.
Searle & Co., No. 770271 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. March 6, 1987); Lightly
v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 765731 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. Jan. 7, 1987).
95. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 410, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976)
(en banc) (holding formal deposition is exclusive means to discover informa-
tion about patient's physical condition and permitted only after defendant's
showing of good cause).
96. See, e.g., Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981) (ordering
defendant to refrain from engaging in private conversations with plaintiff's
physicians).
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monly cite policies including the patients' right to privacy,97
physicians' ethical 9s or fiduciary duties,99 physicians' potential
liability for unauthorized disclosure of privileged informa-
tion,10 0 and protection of physicians from unnecessary harass-
ment.10 1 Some courts have imposed a duty of total loyalty on
physicians, including an obligation to testify only on behalf of
their patients. 10 2 These courts value the physician-patient bond
97. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588,
499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert
denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 152, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585
(Queens County Sup. Ct.) (citing possible charges of professional misconduct
against physician), aff'd mem., 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1979).
99. See, e.g., Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding
doctor owes fiduciary duty of confidentiality to patient); Piller v. Kovarsky,
194 N.J. Super. 392, 396, 476 A.2d 1279, 1281 (Law Div. 1984) (recognizing that
nature of physician-patient relationship "imposes fiduciary obligations on the
physician").
100. A court may hold a physician who discloses privileged information
without a proper waiver civilly liable for breach of patient confidentiality. See
Note, supra note 51, at 617 (noting courts may hold physicians liable for disclo-
sure using four major theories: breach of physician's duty of confidentiality;
violation of statute defining physician conduct; breach of implied contract; or
invasion of patient's right to privacy). At least seven states have recognized
such a cause of action against a physician. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Home v. Patton, 291
Ala. 701, 708-09, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1973); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 69,
479 N.E.2d 113, 119, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985); Simonsen v. Swenson,
104 Neb. 224, 227, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (per curiam); Hague v. Williams, 37
N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962); MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482,
486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1982); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or.
706, 721, 696 P.2d 527, 535 (1985) (en banc). These courts found physicians lia-
ble for unauthorized extra-judicial disclosure of privileged information or dis-
closure during litigation when patients had not voluntarily placed their
physical condition at issue. At least three other jurisdictions have rejected
such a cause of action against physicians. See, e.g., Logan v. District of Colum-
bia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (D.D.C. 1978); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322,
324 (S.D. Ga. 1957); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 657, 389 S.W.2d 249,
251 (1965). Courts also may recognize a cause of action against a third party
who induced an extra-judicial disclosure. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 803.
These cases, however, have not dealt with physician disclosure after a patient-
litigant waiver. Under these circumstances, physicians have witness immunity
from tort liability for their disclosure of relevant medical information. See,
e.g., Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 956 (1988)
(en banc) (holding physician's statements made in judicial proceedings im-
mune from civil liability).
101. Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336-37
(1976) (en banc).
102. See, e.g., Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146
(1962) (per curiam) (full case not reprinted in state reporter) (declaring physi-
cians owe patients duty of total care and have obligation to refuse to give any
affirmative assistance to defendant, and thus should refuse to testify in de-
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over other interests or relationships. 0 3
B. Ex PARTE INTERVIEWS PERMITTED WITH PATIENT-
LITIGANT WAIVER
Other courts hold that once patients have placed their
physical condition at issue, they forfeit control over the disclo-
sure of relevant medical information. Defendants therefore are
free to conduct ex parte interviews with treating physicians
without the patients' express consent.10 4 Courts and attorneys
may treat the doctor like any other witness, 0 5 and any infor-
fendant's favor); see also Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (declaring physician owes patient duty of undi-
vided loyalty which requires physician to offer medical testimony on patient's
behalf). These courts have prohibited ex parte interviews, valuing the physi-
cian-patient privilege above the fact-finding function of the legal system.
These courts, however, overemphasize physicians' fiduciary duty at the ex-
pense of their legal duty. Section 5.05 of the Current Opinions of the Judicial
Council of the AMA, reprinted in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill.
App. 3d 581, 589, 499 N.E.2d 952, 958 (1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 584, 505
N.E.2d 361, cert denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987), recognizes that "[t]he physician
should not reveal confidential communications or information without the ex-
press consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law." (emphasis ad-
ded). The medical profession recognizes that physicians' ethical duty may give
way to the legal duty to tell the truth; courts should do no less. See also Lil-
lehaug, supra note 4, at 447 (arguing that nothing is wrong with physician tes-
tifying if it enhances search for truth).
103. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
800 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (stating that doctor's disclosure of patient's physical con-
dition to patient's adversary violates public policy); Alexander v. Knight, 197
Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962) (per curiam) (full case not reprinted in
state reporter) (stating doctor's breach of confidential relationship should be
"condemned"); Tate & Toman, supra note 4, at 57 (suggesting that "proper
medical treatment can only be provided if the patient is assured that what the
physician learns in confidence will not be revealed").
104. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska 1987) (stat-
ing that "plaintiffs cannot prevent" physicians from participating in ex parte
interviews); Orr v. Sievert, 162 Ga. App. 677, 678-79, 292 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1982)
(noting patient waives right to control physician when complaint is filed);
Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985) (declaring
plaintiff's counsel can be compelled to authorize such interviews). Other
courts require the patient to sign an authorization for ex parte interviews to
protect the treating physician. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126,
129 (D.D.C. 1983).
105. Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (de-
claring that once physician-patient privilege is waived, "the physician becomes
available for interview just like any other witness"); see also Orr v. Sievert, 162
Ga. App. 677, 679-80, 292 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1982) (stating "once a patient places
his care and treatment at issue in a civil proceedings, [sic] there no longer re-
mains any restraint upon a doctor in the release of medical information con-
cerning the patient within the parameters of the complaint. To hold otherwise
would allow a patient to restrain a doctor who possesses the most relevant in-
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mation relevant 0 6 to the plaintiff's physical condition is discov-
erable through ex parte interviews 'as well as through formal
methods of discovery. 10 7 Courts taking this view reason that,
after voluntarily placing their physical condition at issue, pa-
tients would abuse the medical privilege by retaining control of
the timing or circumstances of the disclosure of relevant medi-
cal information.1 0 8 If courts refused to imply a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege, patients would retain the power to
prohibit ex parte interviews by refusing to waive the privilege,
forcing defendants to meet with treating physicians only during
formal depositions in the presence of the patients' counsel.10 9
Courts allowing ex parte interviews of treating physicians
conclude that concerns about fairness and full disclosure during
litigation outweigh the policies favoring the physician-patient
privilege.110 These courts often limit the scope of inquiry and
formation and opinions from responding to inquiries as to such information...
without a written authorization, court order or subpoena."); Hague v. Wil-
liams, 37 N.J. 328, 335, 181 A.2d 345, 348 (1962) (declaring that "[s]ociety has a
right to testimony and... all privileges of exemption from this duty are ex-
ceptional"); Monahan, Do Ex Parte Interviews Threaten Patient Privacy? No,
BRIEF, Fall 1987 at 6, 10 (suggesting that "[p]hysicians, as are any other wit-
nesses, should be expected to testify truthfully to facts within their personal
knowledge without regard for whether that testimony helps or hurts a particu-
lar party").
106. Courts consider information relevant if it relates causally to the physi-
cal condition at issue. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 864, 574 P.2d 766,
779, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 708 (1978) (en banc); see also Stempler v. Speidell, 100
N.J. 368, 381, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985) (emphasizing that confidential informa-
tion not relevant to litigation is "still protected by the physician-patient privi-
lege and the physician's professional obligation to preserve confidentiality").
107. Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976) (al-
lowing ex parte interviews because filing personal injury lawsuit waives physi-
cian-patient privilege for all relevant information about health or medical
history that plaintiff has put in issue).
108. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983) (calling such
tactics abuse of privilege); see also Sterchi & Sheppard, Defendant's Right to
Secure Medical Information and Records Concerning Plaintiff, 53 UMKC L.
REv. 46, 51 (1984) (arguing patient waives medical privilege by filing suit; this
waiver includes ex parte interviews with treating physicians and courts should
force patients to give written authorizations for such interviews so physicians
will not fear retribution).
109. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128-29 (D.D.C. 1983)
(noting that if patients retain control of physician-patient privilege after plac-
ing their physical condition at issue, patients may monitor defendants' case
preparation by insisting on their counsels' presence at formal depositions with
treating physicians).
110. Id. at 128-29; see also Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456, 480
A.2d 223, 230 (App. Div. 1984) (declaring search for truth and justice mandates
that defendants should have equal access to potential witnesses, even treating
physicians).
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issue protective orders when necessary to prohibit exploration
of irrelevant details of treatment.1 1 1 Courts also may sanction
defendants or their attorneys for abuse of ex parte
interviews 1 12
Attempts to give legal protection to communications be-
tween patients and physicians therefore raise many collateral
issues.113 Most jurisdictions recognize the physician-patient
privilege 114 and imply a waiver of the privilege when a patient
files suit.115 Jurisdictions widely disagree, however, on whether
this implied waiver extends to ex parte interviews of physi-
cians. Some courts hold that the waiver operates to remove the
patients' control over the treating physicians' testimony,
thereby providing defendants with the freedom to conduct ex
parte interviews. Other courts hold that even with an implied
patient-litigant waiver, defendants may use only formal discov-
ery methods and may not conduct ex parte interviews without
patients' express consent.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH: COURTS SHOULD
PERMIT DEFENDANTS TO CONDUCT EX
PARTE INTERVIEWS WITH TREATING
PHYSICIANS
A. COURTS SHOULD PERMIT DEFENDANTS TO CONDUCT Ex
PARTE INTERVIEWS WITH TREATING PHYSICIANS IN
ALL PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Jurisdictions reach conflicting outcomes when determining
whether the patient-litigant waiver extends to ex parte inter-
views. 16 Courts refusing to allow ex parte interviews fail to
111. See, e.g., Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 383, 495 A.2d 857, 864-65
(1985) (advising issuance of protective order if proposed ex parte interview
"threatens to cause such substantial prejudice to plaintiff"); Chester v. Zima,
41 Misc. 2d 676, 677, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Erie County Sup. Ct. 1964) (noting
court can issue protective orders to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,
disadvantage, prejudice, or embarrassment).
112. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983) (not-
ing that such information must be relevant to subject matter of proceedings).
113. Application of the physician-patient privilege has "fostered problems
collateral to those it sought to cure. Serious problems in certain types of litiga-
tion, particularly those matters where the physical condition of the patient
constitutes an issue of prime importance to the fact finder, have led many
commentators to question its value." Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d
1148, 1150 (Alaska 1976).
114. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983) (hold-
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balance reasonably the interests involved and do not give ade-
quate consideration to other protective measures available.
Courts must carefully weigh the conflicting policies protecting
patients' or defendants' rights to ensure that they do not un-
justly deprive defendants of such a critical discovery tool.1 17
Ex parte interviews with any witness encourage candor
and spontaneity118 and are an important and effective method
of obtaining critical information. 19 Ex parte interviews with
physicians have increased significance because the presence of
patients' counsel during a formal deposition may inhibit a phy-
sician's testimony.120 Such interviews facilitate full disclosure
during discovery by providing defendants with private, equal
access to treating physicians without the presence of patients'
counsel.1 2 1 Such informal full disclosure gives defendants an
opportunity properly to prepare defenses and theories of liabil-
ity without exposing information prematurely.12 2 Although
ing that courts should permit ex parte interviews with treating physicians);
Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska 1987) (same); Trans-World
Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976) (same); State ex rel. Stuf-
flebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Stempler
v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985) (same); Lazorick v.
Brown, 195 N. J. Super. 444, 456, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (App. Div. 1984) (same);
Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 954 (1988) (en
banc) (same). But see, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (declaring courts should prohibit ex parte in-
terviews with treating physicians); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328,
347, 429 N.W.2d 891, 900 (1988) (same); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405,
410, 240 N.W.2d 333, 336 (1976) (en banc) (same); Jaap v. District Court, 623
P.2d 1389, 1391 (Mont. 1981) (same); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677,
756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988) (en banc) (same); State ex reL Klieger v. Alby, 125
Wis. 2d 468, 473-74, 373 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 1985) (same).
117. "[T]here are compelling reasons to permit ex parte interviews with all
fact witnesses, including physicians." Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 444.
118. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 959
(1988) (en banc).
119. "[I]t may be impractical and inefficient to produce all treating doctors
for depositions without knowing in advance whether their testimony will be
useful or helpful in resolving disputed issues." Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J.
Super. 444, 455, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (App. Div. 1984) (summarizing various rea-
sons to allow informal discovery); Webster, supra note 4, at 25.
120. If patients retain control of the medical privilege after filing a lawsuit,
this control may intimidate the treating physician by acting as an "inchoate
threat." Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983); see Webster,
supra note 4, at 28 (establishing agreement with treating physician to provide
testimony adverse to patient is "virtually impossible" with patient's counsel
present).
121. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Alaska 1987).
122. If the adversary is present, defense counsel is "well-advised to limit
his examination in order to avoid educating the patient's attorney about the
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courts prohibiting ex parte interviews usually recognize an im-
plied patient-litigant waiver, they minimize the waiver's signifi-
cance1 23 by emphasizing the importance of the physician-
patient privilege 124 over the need for fairness in the fact-finding
process. 125
strength of the patient's case and to avoid exposing the theories of the defense
prematurely." Monahan, supra note 105, at 10.
123. Courts minimize the scope of the implied waiver using a variety of
methods. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (finding patient-litigant waiver "does not authorize a pri-
vate conference between a doctor and defense lawyer"); Jaap v. District Court,
623 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Mont. 1981) (holding patient waived any physician-patient
privilege by filing action placing medical condition at issue, but court did not
have authority to allow ex parte interviews because state procedural rules
were silent about ex parte interviews as method of discovery); State ex reL
Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d 468, 474-75, 373 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Ct. App. 1985)
(minimizing scope of implied waiver by excluding ex parte interviews, absent
patient's express consent). But see Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328,
347, 429 N.W.2d 891, 900 (1988) (finding that in Michigan, physician-patient
privilege is "not automatically waived upon the patient's filing of a lawsuit").
124. None of the cases address the "virtually unanimous scholarly criti-
cism" of the physician-patient privilege. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565,
574 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); see supra note 55. Yet many commentators reason that
the policies behind the physician-patient privilege are tenuous at best. See,
e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2380a, at 829 (explaining that physician-
patient privilege is unjustified and unnecessary because resulting injury to
fact-finding ability of legal process far outweighs any resulting injury done to
physician-patient relationship due to compelled disclosure of medical informa-
tion); Chafee, supra note 55, at 609 (stating that "the reasons usually advanced
for extending the privilege of silence to the medical profession are not wholly
satisfactory"). The privilege is even more suspect in situations in which the
patient voluntarily has taken action that waives the privilege in most jurisdic-
tions. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. Patients already have
jeopardized the privacy and confidentiality of their physicial condition by filing
suit. Courts recognize the injustice of permitting patients to use the privilege
strategically to prove liability regarding a disputed condition after jeopardizing
confidentiality by filing lawsuits. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (1951) (noting that patient-
litigant waiver prevents "one who has placed in issue his physical condition
from invoking the privilege on the ground that disclosure of his condition
would cause him humiliation. He cannot have his cake and eat it too."). By
retaining control of the medical privilege, patients also may insist on formal
depositions as the only type of meeting permitted between defendants and
treating physicians. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128-29
(D.D.C. 1983) (observing that "[p]arty so wielding the privilege [may] monitor
his adversary's progress in preparing his case by his presence on each occasion
[when] such information is revealed"). Patients' counsel therefore may ob-
serve defendants' trial preparation while they conduct their own preparation
"under no such scrutiny." Id at 129. This one-sided monitoring of defendants'
trial preparation abuses the medical privilege because such use bears "no rela-
tion to the purposes" for which the privilege exists. Id at 129.
125. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Courts attempt to minimize
this problem by equating the information obtained from ex parte interviews
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By limiting the scope of implied waiver, courts ignore the
doctrine's purpose: to prevent patient abuse of the medical
privilege.126 The medical privilege is a powerful weapon, sup-
pressing valuable evidence during litigation 27 without any rem-
edy other than the doctrine of implied waiver.128 Courts
prohibiting ex parte interviews potentially expose the medical
privilege to abuse by the patient, yet none have considered this
danger, 29 nor have they attempted to remedy it.' 30 For exam-
ple, a patient's attorney is free to use favorable treating physi-
cians as witnesses, although effectively eliminating unfavorable
treating physicians by not calling them as witnesses. 13 ' If plain-
tiffs' counsel does not call a particular doctor as a witness, de-
fendants, unaware of the doctor's role in the treatment, will be
unable to use that doctor as a witness. Even if the defendant is
aware of the physician's role, defense attorneys still may be re-
luctant to call such a witness because they will be unable prop-
with that obtained from formal depositions. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Labo-
ratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 597, 499 N.E.2d 952, 963 (1986), appeal de-
nied, 113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (stating
that "the opinion of the treating physician which is disclosed in a deposition is
obviously the same opinion as that which defense counsel would obtain in an
ex parte conference"). But see Monahan, supra note 105, at 10 (suggesting that
if plaintiffs' counsel is present at interview, defense must limit examination to
avoid giving up defense strategy); Webster, supra note 4, at 28 (asserting that
"[p]reparation of the witness for effective trial testimony in the presence of
the plaintiff's counsel is virtually impossible").
126. See supra notes 59, 63 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 39, 125
S.E.2d 326, 331-32 (1962) (noting that physician-patient privilege hid fact that
defendant-patient "was suffering from a complication of serious chronic
diseases").
128. See supra notes 59-60, 63 and accompanying text.
129. The purpose of the medical privilege is to shield the patient from
harm, rather than to give the patient a weapon to use in subsequent litigation.
See, e.g., State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)
(prohibiting defendant's use of privilege as "a shield and a dagger at one and
the same time.") (citations omitted in original). Courts have emasculated the
doctrine of implied waiver, the legal system's only protection from patient
abuse of the medical privilege. See supra notes 58-59. Courts imply a formal
"waiver" of privilege, but in practical terms, the patient remains free to abuse
the privilege and intimidate the physician with no recourse for the defendants.
See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128-29 (D.D.C. 1983) (retaining
control of medical privilege and using control to prohibit ex parte interviews
allows patients to abuse privilege because such use bears "no relation to the
purposes" for which privilege exists).
130. Some courts hold that formal depositions provide sufficient protection
for defendants' interests, but this reasoning ignores the importance of ex parte
interviews with treating physicians. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying
text.
131. Webster, supra note 4, at 28.
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erly to prepare the doctor's testimony without opposing
counsel's interference. 132
Courts prohibiting ex parte interviews focus on defendants'
potential abuse of the privilege. Communications during ex
parte interviews may jeopardize the physician-patient relation-
ship by damaging the patient's trust 13 3 if the physician exposes
information that remains privileged after the patient files a
lawsuit.13 4 This reasoning fails to recognize the protections
available to patients in the event such an abuse occurs. If an
overriding threat to the physician-patient privilege exists, the
patient may seek protective orders to limit, or in extreme cases,
132. Id at 28; Monahan, supra note 105, at 10 (emphasizing that presence
or absence of patient's attorney likely will influence communications between
treating physician and defense counsel).
133. See, e.g., Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333,
337 (1976) (en banc) (observing that ex parte interviews may destroy patients'
trust by allowing secret meetings between defense counsel and physicians);
Loudon v. Mhyre, 113 Wash. 2d 675, 679, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (1988) (en banc) (ex-
plaining that "mere threat" of ex parte interviews "may have a chilling effect
on the physician-patient relationship").
134. See, e.g., Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 410, 240 N.W.2d at 336-37 (finding
that despite patient-litigant waiver, courts must prohibit ex parte interviews
because defense counsel, without supervision, might abuse physician-patient
privilege by asking treating physicians about irrelevant matters). Another,
often unspoken, concern is that an ex parte interview will provide defense
counsel with an opportunity to influence a treating physician's testimony. The
court in Stempler v. Speidell recognized that the patient has a dual interest in
preventing ex parte interviews:
The interest advanced as primary is the desire to protect from disclo-
sure by the physician confidential information not relevant to the liti-
gation and therefore still protected by the patient-physician privilege
and the physician's professional obligation to preserve confidentiality.
An equally if not more important interest of the plaintiff ... is the
desire to preserve the physician's loyalty to the plaintiff in the hope
that the physician will not voluntarily provide evidence or testimony
that will assist the defendant's cause.
Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 381, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985).
Yet the potential to influence trial testmony is "inherent in every contact"
between defense counsel and treating physicians. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99
F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983). Because this potential exists during any such
contact, prohibiting ex parte interviews creates damage much greater than the
resulting benefit. See, e.g., Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456, 480
A.2d 223, 229 (App. Div. 1984) (reasoning that "[t]o speculate about sinister
motives of attorneys and treating doctors and to establish additional limita-
tions on the right to seek out evidence as a matter of policy would do mischief
to the adversary system"). Moreover, the danger of patients' counsel influenc-
ing physicians' testimony is greater than the danger defendants' lawyers pose.
Webster, supra note 4, at 25 (stating that "since plaintiff's counsel is usually
the first to contact the treating physician, his opportunity to influence trial
testimony is much greater than is defense counsel's, whose meetings with the
doctor will occur much later").
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to prohibit ex parte interviews.135 Courts also may punish de-
fendants or their attorneys to deter potential abuse.136 More-
over, the risk to the physician-patient relationship exists in any
contact between defendants and physicians, whether that con-
tact occurs during an ex parte interview, a formal deposition, or
trial.137 Courts recognizing an implied waiver open the door to
potential harm to the physician-patient relationship, yet reason
that fairness to defendants justifies this risk. 38
Courts prohibiting ex parte interviews also emphasize pro-
tection of physicians' interests. Courts may view ex parte inter-
views as unnecessary intrusions on physicians, 39 ignoring the
possibility that physicians may want to state their views to de-
fendants privately, to act as expert witnesses for defendants,140
or to prepare properly before giving a formal deposition.' 41
Courts also use physicians' potential tort liability for unau-
thorized disclosure to justify prohibiting ex parte interviews. 142
The presence of plaintiff's counsel at a formal deposition may
protect physicians from improperly disclosing privileged infor-
135. See, e.g., Stempler, 100 N.J. at 383, 495 A.2d at 864-65 (emphasizing
that patients may seek protective orders if proposed ex parte interview war-
ranted court supervision); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549
A.2d 950, 959-60 (1988) (en banc) (demonstrating that court may limit ex parte
interview by issuing protective order).
136. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (as-
serting that there are "sanctions enough" for any adversary who improperly
attempts to influence a witness).
137. Id. at 128. Physicians may possess information contrary to a patient's
claim, but this information may come to light during a formal deposition or
during an ex parte interview. Lillehaug, supra note 4, at 445.
138. During formal depositions or trial testimony, the physician still may
give evidence that damages the patient's lawsuit, thus resulting in the patient's
loss of trust. See supra note 137; cf. Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 381, 495
A.2d 857, 864 (1985) (emphasizing that patients seek to retain physicians' loy-
alty hoping that physicians thus will be reluctant to help patients' adversaries
during litigation). Informal interviews between patients' attorneys and treat-
ing physicians after defendants have conducted such ex parte interviews may
allay patients' concerns about secret disclosure. Webster, supra note 4, at 25.
139. See, e.g., Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 409, 240 N.W.2d at 336 (suggesting
that court supervision of physicians' depositions protects "the medical profes-
sion against unnecessary harassment or involvement in the discovery proce-
dure") (citation omitted).
140. "An important practical effect of a rule prohibiting ex parte confer-
ences is that it prevents a defendant from utilizing a treating physician as an
expert witness." Webster, supra note 4, at 28.
141. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 412, 240 N.W.2d at 337 (explaining
that "[e]xcept for the loss of a possible tactical advantage to defense counsel,
no other reason has been suggested or occurs to us which would justify expos-
ing doctors to the hazard of potential tort liability").
[Vol. 73:14511480
EX PARTE INTERVIEWS
mation, thus preventing tort liability for breach of the patient's
right to privacy or professional discipline for unprofessional
conduct. 14 3 This reasoning, however, fails to recognize that
state legislatures adopted the privilege primarily to protect pa-
tients, rather than their physicians. 4 4 These courts also fail to
recognize that physician participation in ex parte interviews al-
ways is voluntary.145 If the physician or defendant abuses the
privilege, the patient has additional causes of action against the
physician for breach of the privilege146 and against the defend-
ant for inducing the breach.147
Thus, the concerns of courts prohibiting ex parte inter-
views fail to outweigh the interviews' value. Many of the con-
cerns that support the physician-patient privilege 48 lapse when
a patient files a lawsuit.149 As a policy matter, patients may not
claim that divulging medical information will humiliate them
after they voluntarily have exposed that information to disclo-
sure by filing suit.150 Patients' expectations of privacy, particu-
larly with respect to the condition at issue, also decrease
because of the public nature of the litigation process.' 5 ' Be-
cause courts may compel physicians to testify at trial, ex parte
interviews merely allow defendants to obtain relevant medical
143. Id. at 411, 240 N.W.2d at 337.
144. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
145. State ex rel Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (asserting that court "has no authority to compel" physician to
grant ex parte interview). Ex parte interviews will not, however, jeopardize
the physician's ethical duty, because the physicans' code of ethics permits dis-
closure when "required to do so by law." Section 5.05 of the Current Opinions
of the Judicial Council of the AMA, reprinted in Petrillo v. Syntex Laborato-
ries, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589, 499 N.E.2d 952, 958 (1986), appeal denied,
113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987). Physicians
will not breach their fiduciary duty of confidentiality because they have wit-
ness immunity for the disclosure of any medical information that is relevant to
patients' lawsuits. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d
950, 956-57 (1988) (en banc).
146. See supra note 100.
147. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
803 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (reasoning that "when one induces a doctor to divulge
confidential information in violation of that doctor's legal responsibility to his
patient, the third party may also be held liable in damages to the patient").
148. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
150. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227,
232, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (1951) (en banc).
151. Placing a specific physical condition at issue reduces a patient's pri-
vacy expectation regarding any privileged information related to that condi-
tion. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 954-55
(1988) (en banc).
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information earlier in litigation and prevent plaintiffs from
abusing the physician-patient privilege. 52 Ex parte interviews
do not unduly threaten the patient's medical treatment because
the physician remains legally and ethically bound to give the
patient proper medical care and to protect any information not
relevant to the patient's lawsuit. 53
Allowing ex parte interviews supports the policy underly-
ing the doctrine of implied waiver: prevention of patient abuse
of the physician-patient privilege through use of the privilege
as an adversarial tactic. 5 4 Ex parte interviews help minimize
such abuse by offering defendants equal access during the criti-
cal pretrial stage to relevant information that treating physi-
cians possess. 5 5 This access lessens the dangers of strategic or
partial disclosure by the patient, preventing patients from using
the privilege as a sword rather than a shield. 5 6 Patients will be
unable to disclose only favorable information while concealing
unfavorable information by invoking the physician-patient priv-
ilege.' 57 If a patient places a physical condition at issue, the de-
fendant should have meaningful access to all information
necessary to defend against the plaintiff's allegations. Ex parte
interviews therefore would increase the probability of full dis-
closure during the discovery and litigation process. 5 8
B. ARGUMENTS FOR PERMITTING Ex PARTE INTERVIEWS IN
DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE CASES ARE EVEN MORE
COMPELLING
Courts generally have analyzed the issues of the physician-
patient privilege, waiver, and ex parte interviews in drug and
medical device cases in the same manner as in other cases in-
152. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 42, 106 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 63; see also Sklagen v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp.,
625 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that "[h]aving waived the medical
privilege as to materials favorable to her position it would be manifestly unfair
to allow plaintiff to invoke the privilege to shield similar materials which are
potentially damaging").
155. Chester v. Zima, 41 Misc. 2d 676, 677, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Erie
County Sup. Ct. 1964) (ordering patient to release medical records during dis-
covery because material information "normally in the sole possession or under
the control of one party" should be available during discovery to facilitate true
evaluation of case and to eliminate surprise in litigation).
156. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
157. Webster, supra note 4, at 28.
158. Full discovery and disclosure facilitate just results in litigation,
thereby increasing the legitimacy of the legal process. See Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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volving a treating physician as a potential witness.159 Consider-
ations unique to drug and medical device cases, however, offer
additional support for allowing ex parte interviews. Resolution
of the ex parte issue is critical in these cases, requiring analysis
beyond the foregoing argument concerning ex parte interviews
generally. Although physicians and defendants face unique cir-
cumstances in drug and medical device cases, courts have ig-
nored all special considerations when making this analysis, and
have focused only on general considerations.
In drug and medical device cases, the physician's knowl-
edge concerning the causes, nature, extent, and treatment of
the plaintiff's injury also is relevant,1 60 yet pales in comparison
to the significance of the physician's product knowledge.161 In
addition to requiring evidence regarding injury and causation,
the defendant also needs to discover and understand the physi-
cian's product knowledge and opinions in connection with the
warning and proximate cause issues. 62
The patient's interests do not change when analyzing the
ex parte issue in drug and medical device cases. 63 The special
needs of defendants, however, add substantial weight when bal-
ancing the ex parte issue in drug and medical device cases. The
defendants' ability to investigate physicians' independent
159. Courts adopt the same reasoning to evaluate the propriety of ex parte
interviews of physicians in drug and medical device cases as used in other per-
sonal injury cases. For example, the court in a drug liability case, Schramel v.
G.D. Searle & Co., No. 86-0198 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1988), granted summary judg-
ment based on a physican's affadavit resulting from an ex parte interview af-
ter the court permitted ex parte interviews in Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa.
Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 958-59 (1988) (en banc), a case involving medi-
cal malpractice. Jurisdictions limiting defendants to formal methods of discov-
ery in other personal injury cases also follow the same analysis in drug and
medical device cases. The courts in Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13-
15, 509 N.E.2d 1376, 1383-84 (1987), and Yates v. El-Deiry, 160 Ill. App. 3d 198,
201-02, 513 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (1987), both medical malpractice cases, permitted
ex parte interviews following the same reasoning used in Petrillo v. Syntex
Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986), appeal denied,
113 Ill. 2d 584, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert denied 483 U.S. 1007 (1987), a drug liability
case.
160. See supra notes 9, 25-29 and accompanying text. The medical cause is-
sue often is more complicated in drug or medical device cases, where the possi-
bility of alternate causes may be a matter of inference from circumstantial
evidence, from medical records, or from the physician's interpretation of objec-
tive or subjective tests and findings. The treating physician's input in this area
also is critical. See supra note 24.
161. See supra notes 25-29.
162. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 133-34
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knowledge164 about the product and the adequacy of the prod-
uct's warning is a prerequisite to preparation of the learned in-
termediary and proximate cause defenses.165
Permitting ex parte interviews also accommodates the spe-
cial role of physicians as "two-hatted" witnesses in drug and
medical device cases. In addition to possessing privileged infor-
mation about the patient, physicians also wear the hats of fact
and opinion witnesses regarding the product at issue. 166 The
physicians' general information about the product is not privi-
leged because the medical privilege protects only communica-
tions between the patient and the physician,167 and these facts
are independent of any protected communications. Forbidding
ex parte interviews unnecessarily cloaks this nonprivileged in-
formation with the mantle of the physician-patient privilege.
Because no privilege is available, prohibiting ex parte inter-
views robs defendants of their right to prepare this un-
privileged testimony privately without the presence of patients'
counsel.168
Society places great value on drugs and medical devices; as
a result, manufacturers may market them despite their charac-
164. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. Defendants are less
likely to abuse treating physicians during ex parte interviews in drug or medi-
cal device cases because of the underlying relationship between defendants
and treating physicians. Manufacturers have a continuing relationship with
prescribing physicians and cannot afford to harrass or abuse their customers.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Defendants' additional incentive
to protect prescribing physicians is not present in other types of personal in-
jury cases and also supports ex parte interviews in the drug and medical device
context.
167. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
168. Forced presence of patients' counsel during this preparation may vio-
late defense counsels' protection for work product. See, e.g., Weaver v. Mann,
90 F.R.D. 443, 444 (D.N.D. 1981) (stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) protects defendant's written records about conversations with plain-
tiff's treating physician in anticipation of litigation as attorney work product).
The work product doctrine also protects defendants' selection of documents to
be used during litigation. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.
1985) (emphasizing that "the selection and compilation of documents by coun-
sel" must be given "an almost absolute protection from discovery"); James Ju-
lian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (holding that for
cases involving extensive document discovery, such as drug and medical device
cases, the process of document selection "is often more critical than pure legal
research"). But see Comment, Suppose You Want to Depose Opposing Coun-
se" Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 73 MINN. L. REV. 1116, 1135-41 (1989)
(arguing that protecting document selection as attorney work product ignores
case law and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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terization as "unavoidably unsafe products."'169 If courts give
plaintiffs an unfair tactical advantage, the courts will more
likely find the manufacturers liable. Eventually, such liability
could result in manufacturers taking helpful drugs and medical
devices off the market because of the high penalties imposed.
70
Ex parte interviews minimize patients' tactical advantage in
these cases and allow manufacturers equal access to crucial in-
formation, thereby advancing the policies underlying the spe-
cial status accorded drug and medical device manufacturers.
C. GUIDELINES FOR ALLOWING Ex PARTE INTERVIEWS
Courts should allow ex parte interviews with treating phy-
sicians when a patient has filed a lawsuit placing a physical con-
dition directly at issue in a drug or medical device case.'
7
'
Courts should recognize an implied waiver that sets aside the
physician-patient privilege immediately after the plaintiff has
filed a lawsuit. 72 The waiver should apply to all information
relevant to the condition at issue.173 This immediate waiver
protects the defendant from patient abuse of the medical privi-
lege. 174 It also permits the defendant properly to prepare the
defenses unique to drug and medical device cases.
175
To protect patients' interests, courts may conduct prelimi-
nary hearings to determine the proper scope of defendants' dis-
covery. Courts may issue protective orders either limiting the
scope of an ex parte interview 76 or forbidding a specific inter-
view on the patient's showing of good cause.' 77 In addition,
169. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1980); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 61, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97
(1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 768, 417 N.E.2d 1002, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980).
170. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245
Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988) (discussing "possibility that the cost of insurance and
of defending against lawsuits will diminish the availability and increase the
price of pharmaceuticals is far from theoretical" and listing products that man-
ufacturers either have increased in price or withdrawn from market because
of fear of liability for large judgments); cf. Schwartz, supra note 24, at 1141
(suggesting that imposition of strict liability on drug and medical device manu-
facturers may drive existing products off market and stifle research and devel-
opment of new products).
171. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
176. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 959
(1988) (en banc).
177. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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courts may impose sanctions on defendants abusing the medical
privilege through improper influence or attempts to obtain
privileged, irrelevant information.178
The physician's participation in the ex parte interview
should be voluntary. 79 In addition, the physician's counsel may
be present during the ex parte interview to protect the physi-
cian's legal interests. If the physician refuses to participate,
such refusal will limit the defendant's access to formal methods
of discovery.L80
The court should order the defendant to inform the physi-
cian of the scope of the interview in advance and to provide the
physician with a copy of the court order. 1 ' This procedure will
protect both the physician's and patient's interests in proper
disclosure. During the interview, the physician may disclose all
patient information relevant to the plaintiff's claim. The physi-
cian also is free to disclose all nonprivileged information, in-
cluding all facts relevant to the learned intermediary and
proximate cause defenses, any independent product knowledge,
and the physician's general experience and opinions about the
drug or medical device at issue.
CONCLUSION
Courts have ignored the unique implications of drug and
medical device cases when determining whether defendants
have the right to conduct ex parte interviews of treating physi-
cians. Defendants in these cases have a particular need to in-
terview prescribing physicians because of their wealth of
relevant, nonprivileged information that is critical to the proper
preparation of the unique defenses available in such cases. Ex
parte interviews are vital discovery tools serving purposes far
different from formal methods of discovery. Courts frequently
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
179. See Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 382, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (1985)
(stating that "physician... need not cooperate if he believes that would com-
promise his professional responsibilities").
180. See id. (reasoning that if physicians refuse to grant ex parte inter-
views, defendants are left with only formal methods of discovery).
181. See O'Brien v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3-88-282 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1989). In a
case involving the prescription drug Feldene, Judge Magnuson affirmed a
magistrate's order requiring the plaintiff to execute medical authorizations
permitting ex parte interviews. Id. He also ordered the defendant to give a
copy of the magistrate's order to the physician interviewed. Id.; see also Doe
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1983) (ordering patient to exe-
cute medical authorizations permitting ex parte interviews); Lazorick v.
Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 456, 480 A.2d 223, 230 (App. Div. 1984) (same).
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have denied defendants the right to conduct ex parte interviews
with treating physicians, however, because courts have overem-
phasized policies behind the physician-patient privilege while
discounting policies supporting full and fair access to relevant
information during litigation. Courts prohibiting ex parte in-
terviews not only provide patients with a significant litigation
advantage, but also inadvertently may promote patients' abuse
of the medical privilege. Prohibiting ex parte interviews forces
defendants either to depose treating physicians formally, or to
forgo the physicians' information.
Because ex parte interviews are vital tools of discovery,
courts should allow defendants to conduct such interviews. Ex
parte interviews are the most flexible, balanced solution to the
inevitable conflict between the physician-patient privilege and
the need for the discovery of all relevant information in these
cases. Permitting ex parte interviews serves the policy of full
disclosure by allowing defendants equal access to all witnesses.
Allowing ex parte inteviews gives courts the flexibility to bal-
ance the conflicting interests involved, so that physicians, de-
fendants, and the courts do not suffer from unnecessary and
inappropriate application of the physician-patient privilege.
Barbara Podlucky Berens
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